HE emigration that for a century and a half had been building up the old colonies of England was only slightly interfered with by the change in the political status of those colonies after the American Revolution. After !783 as before, every year saw the new republic enriched by thousands of settlers from the old country, while Canada remained neglected and unknown •. The war of 1812-14 to a certain extent changed this: in the first place, it made a great deal of very bad blood between Britain and her former colonies; in the second, it called attention to the existence of a British portion of the New World. That Canada got much advertisement out of the war among the emigrating masses is doubtful; that she got a good deal amongst officialdom appears fairly evident. At any rate, for several years afterwards, the war, and considerations arising out of it, governed official opinion on emigration to, and settlement in, Canada.
by ex-soldiers; other settlers would not voluntarily go near so dangerous a frontier, and if left vacant, they would soon fill up with an American population that would willingly sit on whichever side of the fence best suited for the time being. Even the soldiers would not be too reliable, for, without exception, desertion had proved a drain on every corps employed in frontier duties; "the ideal blandishments of the United States is so powerful an incitement that the corps of the highest established reputation have not escaped frequent desertions. "s After the war was over, the formation of a second line of communication between Montreal and Upper Canada was proposed. This line was to run vi• the Rideau and Trent Rivers and Lake Simeoe to Lake Huron. It was pointed out that such a line could be made in war only at great expense, but that if the country along it could be settled, when the n•eed arose, there would be roads over the portages and plenty of transport available along the route. 4 This was perfectly correct, of course, and undoubtedly the S't. Lawrence was a very precarious line in time of war; from Kingston to Montreal, for example, the only settlers whose loyalty could be depended on had been the Scots of Stormont and Glengarry.
• If people would only go where they were told and cast their lots according to the doubtlessly sound plans of the military chiefs, the desired settlements might have been made. But pioneers, like other people, have a way of looking out for themselves first and the state afterwards, so that the second line was slow in forming, and emigrants passed by the beautiful lakes (and barren rocks) of the Rideau to the more fertile lands of the west. Not for over twelve years more was the line formed, and then not by settlement, but by the engineers of the mother country in the building of the Rideau canal.
Opinions in the matter of strategic settlement were indeed much more common than accomplishments; the Scottish settlers sent out by Bathurst (to whom we shall refer again) were, it is true, placed in the Eastern district of Upper Canada along the frontier, but the deciding motive in their case was the fact that in that locality they would be in touch with other Scottish settlers who had preceded them. 5 The most formal attempts made to colonize on the strategical plan were the Rideau and Drummonda Baynes to the governor, 18 June, 1814.
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• F. P. Robinson as above. ville military settlements. Plans for semi-socialistic communities in British North America were, of course, legion. It was easy enough to sit in a London club and draw a picture of a beautiful little Utopia somewhere out in America where the citizens were the best of soldiers and the most industrious of pioneer farmers at one and the same time, but it was quite another matter to translate these schemes into accomplished facts. 6 To the credit of the Colonial Office, be it said', most of these schemes to kill two birds with one stone died a quiet death within the confines of the United Kingdom. The government's own scheme, however, was proceeded with. All disbanded soldiers were to be given land on Within a year or two after the end of the war the strategic note was perceptibly softened; officers who had fought were recalled; general peace had come and an active policy of defence gave way to a state of mind which, while recognizing that the have absconded, abandoning valuable farms; even Members of the Provincial Legislature have gone over to the enemy." Thus the doughty patriot, Baynes? His views were the views of officialdom. They were put into official form in Bathurst's despatch to Drummond of January 10, 1815, in which orders were given that no land was to be granted to Americans, and that they were to be prohibited as far as possible from coming into Canada. Nevertheless, Americans kept coming and, to keep them out of Upper Canada, a rather ingenious use of a current provincial statute was resorted to. All persons who had not been. resident six months in the province, or who had not taken the oath of allegiance, could be "dismissed" upon very slight grounds.
Lieutenant-governor Gore ordered the magistrates not to administer the oath to any person "without a special authority"; no "special authority" being likely to be extended for the adtninistration of the oath to Americans, they thus became automatically subject to "dismissal"•. n In addition, all children of Loyalists when applying for their land-grants were required to furnish a certificate proving their loyalty during the war. '•-The refusal of the oath of allegiance was continued during the following years, and residence in the United States during the war became prima-facie evidence of enemy nationality? On the other hand, we have a glimpse of slowly changing public opinion in some "Resolutions proposed to the Commons House of Assembly on the 3rd April, 1817" and published in the Kingston Gazette of April 12. These seek to establish by existing statutes (13 Geo. II and 30 Geo. III) that Americans, despite the Revolution, still An interesting phase of the immigration from the south was the movement initiated by Buchanan, having for its aim the sending of British subjects already in America to Canada.. He got permission to issue passports to these people (strictly excluding those who had been there during the war) and, painting in glowing terms the prospects awaiting them in Canada, he managed to induce several hundred to go there; he judged the hatred they had conceived of everything American--presumably owing to their lack of success among the Americans--would be most useful in Canada. Buchanan's zeal outstripped his prudence and some of his immigrants were refused admittance by Gore On the grounds that they were seditious Baltimore Irish and a very bad lot indeed. But the consul, elated with his success, got permission to advance the fare of such others as were willing to go. Finally the stream of work-hungry men began to dismay leisurely Canadian officialdom, and Buchanan, vi8 London, was ordered to restrain his enthusiasm.
It is stated for he forwarded "about 3,000 poor Irish who are chiefly located in the township of Cavan and have prospered "26 Turning now to the attitude, more particularly, of the Imperial government on emigration to British North America, we find that, during the war it had appeared as if a well-considered and comprehensive scheme were about to be embarked upon. The Scottish settlers, to whom we have referred above, were quickly got together, brought to Glasgow, looked after until embarked, and on arrival had land allotted to them. Everything was carefully supervised, and apparently a fair measure of success was obtained. The authorities were very careful to explain that their motive was the diversion from the United States of inevitable emigration--a motive which was as much stressed then as now. Bathurst terms it"too obvious to require observation",•7"one of the great objects of His Majesty's Government",•8 and so on. It is very explicitly stated in the official notice of the discontinuance of free passages •9 that "it cannot be too much impressed on the minds of applicants that the wishes and instructions of Government are directed not to the increase of emigration from this part of the united kingdom [i.e., Scotland] but to direct to the British Provinces in North America, the surplus population that would otherwise proceed to the United States". Letters having "diversion" for their theme rained upon the government. Typical examples are those of a Mr. Bell (June 22, 1814) from Scotland, who claims that the system of farming in vogue is drawing men overseas daily and that free passages will take them to Canada in preference to the United States; and of the lieutenant-governor of Guernsey (April 21, 1816) , who forwards a long list of Channel Islanders who will go to the United States if some inducement to go to Canada be not given them.
The Hundred Days put a stop to government aid to emigrants; under the altered circumstances, writes Bathurst five days before Waterloo, no government encouragement to go to Canada is for the present to be given to anybody, and the administrator need not expect nearly as many families as it had previously been intended to send.
•s This cessation of an active colonizing policy, it was thought, was only temporary; but, as it turned out, direct aid, insofar as free passages and other direct assumption of expense• by the Home government went, was not resumed. The need for economy at home, and perhaps the influence of those land-holders hostile to a policy which threatened to rob them of their tenants, brought the movement to a close; on March 23, 1816, official notice was given that no more free passages would be provided. A despatch of the following summer curtailed aid to the land grant alone, •ø and a recommendation of Sherbrooke's that settlers be given subsistence for one year after arrival met with a discouraging negative. 2• The following spring a few were given agricultural implements (at the province's expense), and free land was given to approved settlers, who, by the way, had to leave England before June 1, 22 but thereafter, with every outward despatch, the need for economy is inculcated. The era of paternal colonization ends.
What followed it? If we look fo• any broad and well-defined policy of emigration and settlement, we shall be disappointed.
Whatever policy there w•s, was a hand-to-mouth policy, based on parsimony; of organized effort to colonize and settle the new country, there was none. In fact, English public opinion seemed to be quite hostile to the colonization of Canada, even when privately undertaken. A prevailing view was that British North America must, sooner or later, be absorbed by the United States, probably not representative, but they help to explain why the authorities were unwilling to adopt an aggressive policy.
Towards the end of 18W, the Colonial Office began to discriminate against the poor emigrant. Persons to be favoured were now to be those "who shall be possessed of some means to carry out and maintain a certain number of Cultivators"? As securities would be required from these people, it was hoped that the evils occasioned by the influx of needy emigrants during the last year would be obviated. In 1817 there had been 6,800 immigrants, nearly all desperately poor; great numbers were maintained at the colonial government's expense and by charity. •4 Insomuch as this policy determined that the Canadas were not to be a happy hunting ground for the Motherland's poor, it was sound. Unfortunately, it did not last, and in succeeding years British America again became the objective for hordes of hungry paupers, while the well-to-do tended to go to the United States. In 1818 the policy was reaffirmed. 25 One of the first settlers to proceed under it was a Mr. Milburn, who was recommended to Sherbrooke by Bathurst (as all settlers of this type were supposed to be) and noted as leaving for Canada with a number of "followers" and as a suitable person for a grant. No further change in the official attitude arose during 1819, the end of the period under review.
We have now reviewed the characteristic policies and opinions of the authorities, both home and colonial, in respect to immigration into Canada during the five years' post-war period. We 
